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# Ballots, a Barrier against the Use of Bullets and Bombs

## DEMOCRATIZATION AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

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Numerous empirical investigations have demonstrated that democracies are prone to cooperate with one another and that they almost never wage war against one another. Such research has inspired hope that so-called democratic peace might be achieved in the post-cold-war era, especially in light of the rapid diffusion of democracy worldwide since the mid-1970s. This article collates two streams of previously unexamined evidence that speak to the promise of this hope. Looking cross-nationally at the incidence of overt military intervention between 1975 and 1991, the study discovers that democracies were unlikely to be the targets of this form of coercive diplomacy. Both democracies and nondemocracies intervened in the internal affairs of democracies less than would be expected by chance. After exploring several contending explanations for this finding, this article advances some hypotheses about why being a democracy may shelter such states from foreign attack and considers the contribution democratization can make to national security.

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Much research has shown that "wars (or even military conflicts short of war) are nonexistent (or very rare) among democracies" (Gleditsch 1992, 369-70; see also Ray 1995; Russett 1993, 1995). This fact has not been lost on policy makers in search of a guidepost for their post-cold-war foreign policies. For example, the Group of Seven (G-7) has made the promotion of democracy (itself a pillar of the Helsinki process and a platform of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) a principle around which to focus its blueprints for a twenty-first century peace. Inspired in part by the rapid diffusion of democratization since the late 1980s (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Starr 1995a), the major industrialized democracies have anchored their security policies on the belief that a world of democratic states would be a peaceful world (Barkan 1994, 2).

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The purpose of this study is to inspect a key policy instrument, military intervention, that the established democracies are currently using to enlarge the democratic community. Given “the growing tendency to justify interventions on the basis of securing or promoting democracy” (Gleditsch 1995a, 299), empirical inquiry will allow us to estimate the extent to which the nature of the political system of the target affects decisions to intervene. With the Clinton administration (Christopher 1995) assigning intervention a prominent place among the tools through which the United States hopes to foster the spread of democracy, understanding how this frequently used form of military force is related to prevailing notions about the democratic peace becomes important and deserves examination.

## DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

The propensity of democracies to cooperate generally with one another is a critical component of democratic peace theory that challenges realism and, especially, neo-realism by highlighting “the domestic aspects of democracies as determinants of their foreign policies” (Hallenberg 1994, 149). Democratic peace theory, however, derives its popularity primarily from its core proposition—that when conflicts arise between democracies, the parties will resolve them through compromised bargaining rather than resorting to force. The theory presumes that democracy is “a near-perfect *sufficient condition* for peace” (Gleditsch 1995b, 318). The very consistent record indicating that democracies rarely fight one another provides the premise on which faith in the theory resides and from which today’s enthusiasm for it arises (“Democracies and War” 1995, 17).

Interest currently has focused on understanding why the dyadic relationships between members of the liberal democratic community are pacific. This contemporary research has followed Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson in assuming that when a dispute arises between democracies, each will recognize that their shared norms, values, and institutions predispose the other party to rely on negotiated settlement rather than the use of force (Dixon 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Raymond 1994; Russett 1993). In the present research, we propose to elaborate this theory by positing that under certain circumstances, mere knowledge about the political system of the target will determine the type of instrument of statecraft a government will choose to use in responding to a dispute. In particular, we will investigate the types of governments against which military intervention will be chosen as an option. We are interested in discovering if being democratic buffers a regime from becoming a target of intervention and, if so, whether such a shield increases the capacity of democratization to contribute to international security.

## TOWARD AN EXTENDED THEORY

Because democracies hardly ever escalate to full-scale war against one another, an appropriate question is whether there is something about democratic regimes that

shelters them from attack. Instead of focusing on the factors influencing potential initiators' decisions, we will argue that it is also important to examine the impact of the polity type of potential targets on the images and expectations aroused in adversaries in conflict situations.

We will examine the proposition that the attribution *democracy* carries with it the expectation that such a government will favor bargaining, mediation, and compromise over forceful coercion for resolving conflicts (Risse-Kappen 1995). We postulate that the more firmly established the democracy is institutionally, the more likely it is to emphasize pacific methods of conflict resolution (Maoz and Russett 1992; Morgan and Schwebach 1992) and the more likely other states are to assume that its foreign policy will reflect a preference for negotiation and conciliation in dealing with disputes. Because democracies enjoy a reputation as regimes with which an adversary can reason, we will inquire if other states would be inclined to meet them at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield. To the extent that democracies may enjoy a level of security that other types of polities do not, democratization *can*, as democratic peace theory maintains, serve as an antidote to aggression. If states are adverse to using military intervention against a democracy because diplomatic and economic methods of bargaining are available, a liberal democracy's ascribed norms and reluctance to fight may serve as a bulwark against aggression toward them, shaping the incentive structure of adversaries and restraining their desire or need to use force.

The protective shield we postulate to exist for established democracies may not be as applicable to states that are less stable, less constrained, or fledgling democracies. If this reasoning is valid, by extension an adversary can be less confident in assuming that less-stable democracies will necessarily prefer bargaining and negotiation. The behavior of these states that have not yet completed the transition into the stable liberal democratic community and learned to share the norms, values, and institutions that define this community will be less certain and predictable. In fact, scholars have posed contradictory hypotheses regarding what will happen when conflict erupts with such transitional democracies. One group (e.g., Blainey 1988; Enterline 1994, 1996) has proposed that such fledgling or faltering democratic regimes become tempting targets for military intervention because of their strategic vulnerability at the moment, whereas another group (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995a, 1995b) has argued that these regimes are prone to aggression as they attempt to gain control over the turbulent politics caused by democratization or its erosion. An adversary needs to be wary of these fragile democracies and cannot assume that they will exhibit pacific behavior; indeed, their behavior is likely to be unpredictable.

Nondemocracies trigger just the opposite view from democracies (Doyle 1994). Force is not anathema to them or something to avoid. Moreover, liberal democracies may feel justified in confronting dictators and despots who repress their citizens' freedoms and appear to favor strategies that seek to ruthlessly maximize their national power. Although there is risk in considering cooperation with a nondemocracy, there is political capital to be gained by military intervention. Flexing one's muscle can communicate resolve to an authoritarian state perceived willing to take advantage of any opportunity to enhance its power and status. This rationale for dealing punitively

with nondemocracies can become compelling to democracies if the action has the chance of converting the target to a democracy and thereby enlarging the zone of peace.

Our working hypothesis, therefore, is that democracies are less likely to be the targets of military intervention, irrespective of the political system of the initiator. Democracies will be highly adverse to intervening against other democracies, but so too will nondemocracies. Democracies have associated with their behavior the perception that they will abide by the neoliberal tenet that bargaining works or, at the least, is worth a try. Nondemocracies have associated with them adherence to the “realist creed”—that is, they have reputations for believing that competition and conflict are what politics is all about (Waltz, 1995) and for acting in pursuit of power without regard to higher principles. Whereas democracies are perceived to act out of a belief in the importance of solutions that allow for mutual benefit and to prize non-zero-sum exchanges, nondemocracies are considered more prone to define the world in zero-sum terms and to parochially pursue their own self-interests. Thus we hypothesize that when governments choose to intervene, nondemocracies will be the target of choice for both democracies and nondemocracies. In a phrase, we postulate that ballots act as a barrier to the use of bullets and, especially, bombs.

We proceed from the premise that the theory, policy prescriptions, and empirical data that ground ideas about democratic peace need to be elaborated. The study conducted here builds on ideas from attribution theory in psychology as they have been applied to the interactions among states (see, e.g., Jervis 1986; Jönsson 1982; Heradstveit 1979; Risse-Kappen 1995; Stein 1995). According to attribution theory, behavior of others is judged as resulting from dispositional factors, whereas one's own behavior is determined by the current situation. These views are particularly strong when the environment is threatening or there is a potential conflict. Moreover, under such conditions any action of these others is perceived as “more centralized, planned, and coordinated than it is” (Jönsson 1982, 13). “Their” political regime is clearly in control of what is happening, and it represents their orientation to politics. As we have proposed, certain traits are associated with being a democracy or a nondemocracy. These characteristics become part of the heuristics leaders use in planning their strategies when faced with a crisis that could involve the use of force. Assuming that “states’ conceptions of both how and why they should intervene are strongly influenced by [such] shared understandings” (Finnemore 1995, 1), we will investigate the proposition that when the target is perceived to be a democracy, other actors are likely to choose to negotiate or mediate disputes with it rather than use force.

## **BROADENING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM**

Two concerns prompt our taking a further look at democratic peace theory: (1) the restricted focus of previous research on wars and militarized disputes and (2) attention to dyadic interactions without regard for the direction of the behavior. By examining military intervention, we can consider how low-intensity coercive diplomacy fits into the relationship between democratization and peace. By focusing on the direction of the dyadic interaction, we can determine if preferences are exhibited by specific kinds

of initiators for certain types of targets. Specifically, when the regime type of the initiator and target are different, the direction of the interventionary activity is noted.

In this study, we will probe the distribution of those “military operations undertaken openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land in such a manner as to risk immediate combat” (Tillema 1989b, 419), a type of behavior “distinguished from other forms of coercive or intrusive behavior” (Tillema 1994, 251). Despite its obtrusiveness and distinctiveness in international politics and its role as a necessary first step on the path to war, military intervention has been neglected inexplicably in previous investigations of the democratic peace.<sup>1</sup> This oversight is surprising in light of the fact that intervention is arguably the most frequent type of military force in use and under debate today (Blechman 1995; Haass 1994; Kennan 1995; Stedman 1993). Major wars have declined greatly in frequency, and some (e.g., Mueller 1989) advocate they may be nearing obsolescence. Overt military interventions appear to have taken their place, and the threat now exists that “intervention even for good liberal causes may only create more chaos” (Hoffmann 1995, 169).

Thus it is particularly timely to consider more carefully how this category of force short of full-scale warfare fits into democratic peace theory. In a previous study, we (Kegley and Hermann 1995) engaged in an initial exploration of one dimension of this topic. Focusing on the types of governments that *initiate* interventions by using an alternative conceptualization and indicator (Pearson and Baumann 1993-94), we found that democracies were prone to engage in interventionary behavior and that these acts were directed at both nondemocracies and other democratic states. This result suggested the possibility that, as some hypothesize (Hendrickson 1994-95), democracies exhibit “interventionary impulses.” However, our investigation did not sharply define where intervention fits into discussions about the democratic peace; instead, it merely set the stage for such an inquiry by outlining an agenda for future research. Indeed, our heuristic exercise raised more questions than it answered. It led, for example, to the proposition that although democracies are inclined to rely on military intervention as an instrument for exercising influence even with other democracies, many such interventions are not hostile but actually supportive of the governments of the target states—they are undertaken to bolster clients, not to undermine them.<sup>2</sup> Hence there exists a need to delineate more definitively how democracies use military intervention and for what purposes with an indicator that exclusively taps hostile acts of intervention (see also Kegley and Hermann 1997a). By studying the polity types of the *targets* of this use of force, the present research examines if states are more secure from—and less vulnerable to—such hostile interventions as a result of their democratization.

1. Several other researchers (Bremer 1992, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992; Weede 1992) have studied low-intensity conflict in examining the democratic peace and used measures that bear a resemblance to intervention as we are defining it here. They have examined reciprocated violence, threats to use force, displays of force, and uses of force short of war. But none have explored intervention *per se*.

2. Some 58 percent of the interventions between 1974 and 1988 in the Pearson and Baumann (1993-94) data set that democracies targeted at other democratically oriented states were in support of the target’s government or to protect the initiator’s citizens or property. The other 42 percent were hostile acts of coercive diplomacy. In the current study, we are interested in ascertaining whether democratic states are less likely to be the targets of interventions of this latter sort.



Intervention is but one of a range of strategies potential initiators have at their disposal to use in dealing with an adversary. As posited here, the strategy chosen is likely to be affected by the regime type of the potential target—by how the would-be targets are perceived. By distinguishing which polity types are the targets of dyadic interactions, we can explore if democracy acts as a barrier against attack and the extent to which liberal reforms by nondemocracies can provide a means to defense as a substitute for the realist prescription that states must prepare for war if they want peace.

## FRAMING THE INQUIRY: MEASURING INTERVENTION AND POLITY TYPE

### MILITARY INTERVENTION

In assessing military intervention, we rely on the definitional criteria proposed by Tillema (1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1994, 1996). According to his conceptualization, intervention includes the use of force, is intrinsically hostile in intent, frequently entails the loss of soldiers' lives, and violates the rule in international law prohibiting the use of force to affect the internal affairs of other sovereign states. This category of international armed conflict often has been used since 1945 for what George (1992) terms *forceful persuasion*. "Whether serious combat occurs, and how great the toll, depends in part upon how parties within the target and other foreign states respond" (Tillema 1994, 252). Military intervention represents a potential precursor to war.

This form of coercive diplomacy is attractive to policy makers because it provides control over "getting in and getting out" and the costs of military action (Betts 1994; Gelb 1994; Smith 1994). Moreover, intervention can be justified in the name of such high ideals as promoting, preserving, and restoring democracy; peacekeeping; serving humanitarian purposes; or protecting noncombatant minorities from persecution by their own governments. In fact, military intervention often is viewed as a viable alternative to time-consuming trade sanctions and embargoes.

We will use the data that Tillema collected for the years 1975 through 1991. An act of overt military intervention includes an initiator and a target and the movement of the initiator's regular troops onto the territory of the target. The measure excludes "covert operations, military alerts in place, shows of force, deployments of units not immediately prepared for combat, [and] incursions across international borders that do not involve occupation of territory" (Tillema 1994, 265). Operationalized in this way, 216 separate acts of overt military intervention were initiated during this period.

For the purposes we are pursuing here, we have chosen to restrict our analysis to the 1975 through 1991 time period that Huntington (1991) has noted—and Jagers and Gurr (1995) have documented—as the most recent wave (third wave) of democratization. Only in the past quarter century has the number of democracies become sizable. "In the fifteen years following . . . 1974, democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones in approximately 30 countries" (Huntington 1991, 21). "As of the end of 1993, over half, 107 out of 186 countries, [had] competitive elections and various guarantees of political and individual rights—that is, more than twice the number two

decades earlier" (Lipset 1994, 1, using Freedom House data). A consequence of this diffusion of democracy since 1975 is an international system in which the onset of armed conflict with democracies has become equally as probable as that with nondemocracies. Growing interdependence and increased contiguity with democracies have greatly expanded the opportunities for interaction and the possibility for disputes with them, making this period an attractive temporal span in which to test the hypothesis we are examining.

## DEMOCRACY

One of the better inventories of variations in governance patterns throughout the world is found in the Polity data (Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1989, 1990; Jagers and Gurr 1995). These data have been used by most doing research on the democratic peace to assess the degree of "democraticness." The indicators focus on the importance of institutions to defining democracy. The Polity data set includes measures of level of democracy and level of autocracy. Both are composite indexes that reflect the competitiveness and regulation of political participation in the government, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the degree of constraint on the chief executive.

Following Maoz and Abdolali (1989), Maoz and Russett (1992), and Ray (1995), we use a combination of the Polity democracy and autocracy indexes in defining regime type. Because "political systems may contain a mix of characteristics that are typically associated with democracies as well as with autocracies" (Maoz and Russett 1992, 265), we are interested in differentiating those regimes that have high scores on either democracy or autocracy from those with "middling scores on both autocracy and democracy scales" (Gurr et al. 1989, 38). States with high scores on either democracy or autocracy are more likely to be viewed as such by others in the international system and to engender the attributions that accompany having these two types of political systems. Thus regime type is determined here by the formula:

$$\text{Regime Type} = (\text{Democracy Score} - \text{Autocracy Score}) \times \text{Concentration},$$

where both the democracy and autocracy scores are measured on a 0 to 10 scale. Concentration represents "the extent to which power is concentrated or diffused in a political system" (Maoz and Russett 1992, 265) and is assessed on an 11-point scale that taps the scope of a government's power, its institutional control, and the concentration of power in the executive (see Gurr et al. 1990).

The higher the positive value for regime type using this formula, the more democratic and strongly institutionalized the political system; and the higher the negative value, the more autocratic and strongly centralized the political system. States with scores of 16 and higher were categorized as democracies. Such countries were usually rated as a 7 or above on the democracy scale, 3 or below on the autocracy scale, and between 4 and 6 on the concentration scale. States with scores of -20 and below were classified as autocracies. These countries were generally rated as a 3 or below on the democracy scale, 7 or above on the autocracy scale, and between 5 and 7 on the con-



centration scale. Scores between 16 and -20 identified the subset of states in which the characteristics of democracy and autocracy were less differentiated. These countries have been called *anocracies* (see Gurr 1974; Maoz and Abdolali 1989). At times in the analysis, we have combined those states classified as autocracies and anocracies into one category called *nondemocracies*.

Before we proceed, several caveats are in order. First, the Polity data set only includes countries that have populations greater than 500,000 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). This restriction eliminates some of the smaller states that have initiated or been targets of intervention between 1975 and 1991 (13, or 6%, of the interventions occurring during this period). Second, we have used the Polity II data to classify states from 1975 through 1986 and the updated Polity III data to determine regime type from 1987 through 1991. Because Jaggers and Gurr (1995) indicate that the recoding of the Polity II data led to some changes in scores, we have relied on the Polity III scores when there were differences between the two data sets in the earlier time period. Because the concentration index is not yet available for the Polity III data set, we have proceeded by assuming a stable score for this index after 1986 and used the 1986 score in determining regime type for the remaining years.

## WHO INTERVENES AND WHAT POLITIES ARE TARGETED?

Table 1 displays the polity types of the initiators and targets of the interventions occurring between 1975 and 1991. It compares the number of observed democracies, anocracies, and autocracies with the number that would be expected given the distribution of these polity types in the international system during this time period. Goodness-of-fit tests indicate that there is little difference between what would be expected, based on the composition of the international system, and what was observed for the initiators of interventions. Such was not the case for the targets of intervention. More of the targets were autocracies and anocracies, whereas fewer were democracies than the proportion of regime types in the system would predict based on chance alone. Indeed, 61 percent of the chi-square for the data on targets is accounted for by the difference between the observed and expected frequencies for democracies.

An examination of trends in interventionary activity across this time period suggests that as their numbers increased, democracies' use of intervention as an instrument of diplomacy also increased. Democracies, however, were relatively immune to being a target of others' interventions during this period. Table 2 displays these results. It contrasts the interventionary behavior of democracies, anocracies, and autocracies in the first half of the time period, as *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union was souring, with that in the second half, when the cold war was winding down.

The data for states initiating interventions suggest that a change occurred in the behavior of the democracies and autocracies across time. Whereas democracies were underrepresented among the initiators of intervention in the period from 1975 to 1982, given their numbers in the system, they were overrepresented in the years between 1983 and 1991. The reverse was the case for autocracies. Indeed, the democracies and autocracies became more alike in their rates of initiating military intervention across

TABLE 1  
Polity Types of the Initiators and Targets of Intervention, 1975-1991

	Polity Type			Total
	Democracy	Anocracy	Autocracy	
Initiators of interventions	O = 62 E = 68.7	O = 40 E = 32.3	O = 100 E = 101	202
$\chi^2 = 2.5; ns$				
Targets of interventions	O = 28 E = 66	O = 48 E = 31	O = 118 E = 97	194
$\chi^2 = 35.8; p < .001$				

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data. The total number of interventions differs for initiators and targets because eight of the targets were undergoing transitions at the time of the intervention and thus could not be classified on polity type.

TABLE 2  
Trends in the Initiation and Targeting of Intervention by Polity Type, 1975-1991

Years	Number of Interventions	Polity Type		
		Democracy	Anocracy	Autocracy
Initiators of interventions				
1975-1982	124	23 [30]	23 [21]	55 [49]
1983-1991	78	44 [36]	15 [20]	41 [44]
Totals	202	62	40	100
Targets of interventions				
1975-1982	123	10 [30]	28 [21]	63 [49]
1983-1991	71	23 [36]	20 [20]	58 [44]
Totals	194	28	48	118

NOTE: The figures for each time period are the percentages of the interventions that were initiated by, or targeted at, that polity type; the numbers in brackets indicate the percentages of that polity type in the international system during this particular set of years.

time, with both types of polities undertaking approximately two-fifths of the military interventions as the cold war collapsed.

The data on the targets of the interventions show a different picture. The democratic states were underrepresented as targets of interventions across the whole time period, whereas the autocratic states were “picked on” much more than their numbers in the international system would lead us to expect. Thus, although those countries with strong democratic institutions increased their initiation of interventions between 1975

and 1991, such states were rather infrequently chosen as the target for this kind of use of force. The targets of intervention were disproportionately the autocracies. These closed political systems, although initiating only two-fifths of the interventions between 1983 and 1991, were the victims of nearly three-fifths of the interventionary forces.

Extrapolating from these data, the changing distributions suggest that democratic states' increased use of intervention is reflective of the attention being paid to its utility as a policy tool in the present international arena. The record lends support to the proposition advanced by theorists as divergent as the liberal Immanuel Kant and the realist Niccolo Machiavelli (Doyle 1994) that intervention is an attractive instrument for democracies to use in lieu of war. The record also connotes that the purposes for which leaders in democracies envision intervention may have broadened to include a plethora of diplomatic, and not just military, goals. Democratic leaders may be taking seriously their own rhetoric about using this tool of statecraft for promoting, sustaining, and restoring democracy, in part because established democracies are less likely to be the targets of such activity and in part because the contemporary "democratist crusade" (Hendrickson, 1994-95) justifies using intervention to enlarge the community of liberal democracies. Intervention is now perceived as an acceptable tool for political reform—but almost exclusively for the liberalization of nondemocratic states (Blechman 1995).

We have been examining intervenors and targets separately. But what happens when we analyze the dyadic data that integrate initiators and targets of intervention? Table 3 reports these dyadic data, summarizing the frequencies with which the three types of initiators chose to intervene into the three kinds of targets.

Taking into account how we would have expected the 193<sup>3</sup> interventions during this time period to distribute themselves—based on knowledge of the numbers of possible dyads with the various combinations of democracy, anocracy, and autocracy that were in the international system between 1975 and 1991—we find support for our proposition that democracies are less likely to be the targets of military intervention irrespective of the political system of the initiator. The relationship between our hypothesis and the data, using the  $m_b$  statistic, is .99.<sup>4</sup>

Autocracies appear to be the target of choice. States with this polity type targeted interventions at their own kind of polity nearly one and a half times more than their numbers in the system would predict they should. Moreover, both anocracies and democracies also targeted autocracies more than would be expected by chance. The interventionary behavior was directed much less toward democracies. In fact, the interventions involving democratic states as both initiator and target were almost two

3. Earlier in this study we observed that, according to the Tillema data set, 216 interventions occurred during this time period. Some 13 of these interventions involved countries too small to be coded in the Polity data set, and 10 included states undergoing transitions at the time of the intervention so that their polity type was indeterminate. Thus in most of the analyses in this study, the number of interventions examined was 193.

4. The  $m_b$  statistic examines how consistent the observed data are to what the hypothesis under study would predict. It compares the cells in which the data are consistent and inconsistent with the hypothesis and the degree of that consistency and inconsistency. For more detail on this statistic, which ranges from +1 to -1, see Maoz and Russett (1992, 266).

TABLE 3  
The Nature of the Military Interventions by Polity Type, 1975-1991

Initiator	Target			Total
	Democracy	Anocracy	Autocracy	
Democracy	O = 12 E = 22.3	O = 10 E = 10.5	O = 37 E = 32.8	59
Anocracy	O = 4 E = 10.5	O = 16 E = 4.9	O = 18 E = 15.4	38
Autocracy	O = 12 E = 32.8	O = 21 E = 15.4	O = 63 E = 48.3	96
Total	28	47	118	193
$\chi^2 = 54.23; p < .001$ Cramer's V = .37				

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data.

times lower than their numbers predict should have occurred. Autocracies and anocracies did not select democracies as targets either; these nondemocracies intervened into democracies close to three times less than we would have expected.<sup>5</sup>

These findings add credence to the hypothesis that democratic polities benefit from greater security than do their nondemocratic counterparts. The results are supportive of the Wilsonian prophesy that making the world safe for democracy would, indeed, make for a safer world order. As democratic peace theory would argue, democratization may be a viable path to national and international security. The findings also, however, push for deeper explanations. We turn next to consider some factors that might influence the relationships that have been uncovered.

### IS IT MORE THAN DEMOCRACY? SOME CONTENDING EXPLANATIONS

Is there something about the international context or the states that are classified here as democracies that could influence their attributions other than the nature of their political systems? In other words, are there rival hypotheses for why democracies appear to be less often chosen as targets of intervention that are confounded with polity type? In what follows, we will explore some potential contending explanations for our results.

5. The data in Table 3 lend support to the democratic peace proposition. Although the evidence goes along with previous research showing that democracies on occasion have used low-scale military methods against one another (see Footnote 1), democracies appear to intervene in other democracies at a rate much less than that expected by chance.

## THE DIFFUSION OF DEMOCRACY

With democracies' increased prominence in the international system during the time period studied here, could their increased status and growing influence make them less vulnerable to attack? As several scholars (Russett 1993, 138; Starr 1995b, 312) have observed, a "system composed substantially of democratic states might reflect very different behavior than did the previous one composed predominantly of autocracies." It is possible to explore this proposition by comparing the data in Table 3 with data for the period between 1958 and 1974, in which Huntington (1991; see also Ray 1995) noted a wave of "reverse democratization." The process of decolonization in the early 1960s significantly increased the number of independent states in the world. The majority of these states, however, did not choose democratic political systems. With the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik in 1957 and Moscow's growing military parity with the Western democratic powers, an illusion was created that democracy was on the wane and that states with centrally controlled political systems were more productive and a model for rapid industrialization and development (Huntington 1991; Ray 1995). Jagers and Gurr (1995) have documented this period of reverse democratization by using the Polity measures.

Table 4 probes the polity types of the initiators and targets of intervention during this earlier time period and confirms the prior inference that democracies were less likely to be the targets of interventions by other democracies and autocracies than would be expected by chance, given their numbers in the international system. An  $m_b$  statistic of .89 attests to a strong relationship between our hypothesis and the data. However, during this time period, democracies were slightly more likely than expected to be targeted by anocracies, and autocracies were less likely than expected to be chosen as targets. The targets of choice between 1958 and 1974 were the anocracies, those states that were not unambiguously associated with either the liberal democratic or closed polity communities. Democracies were almost two and a half times more likely to target anocracies than expected by chance, and autocracies were one and a half times more likely to target anocracies.

Although being a democracy still seemed to shield a country from intervention during this earlier time period, having the regime type that appeared to be favored in the international system—in this case, the more autocratic political structure—also may have provided some protection. A heightened perception of invulnerability may attend having the dominant polity type. Moreover, the large number of newly independent countries between 1958 and 1974 that were in the throes of establishing their political systems may have been especially vulnerable to finding foreign troops on their soil as both democracies and autocracies tried to influence what polity type they would become.

## COMMON ALLIANCE BONDS

Because democracies evidence more rapid rates of alliance formation among themselves for collective defense (Siverson and Emmons 1991) and display less inclination to disregard alliance commitments when circumstances change (Kegley

TABLE 4  
The Nature of Military Intervention by Polity Type, 1958-1974

Initiator	Target			Total
	Democracy	Anocracy	Autocracy	
Democracy	O = 10 E = 17	O = 27 E = 11	O = 23 E = 25.6	60
Anocracy	O = 12 E = 11	O = 7 E = 7.5	O = 12 E = 16.8	31
Autocracy	O = 17 E = 25.6	O = 25 E = 16.8	O = 37 E = 37.6	79
Total	39	59	72	170

$\chi^2 = 34.89; p < .001$   
Cramer's V = .32

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data.

and Raymond 1990, 1994), they may not be chosen as targets because of these tight alliance bonds rather than an attribution resulting from their polity type. Table 5 presents data on interventions between 1975 and 1991 linking information about alliance bonds with the type of dyad involved. Alliance bonds were categorized using Tillema's (1994, 257, Appendix) cold war alliances data set. These data facilitate judgments regarding the alignment of the initiator vis-à-vis the target. Dyads were classified according to whether the targets were unaligned, in the same alliance as the initiator, or in a different alliance from the initiator.

The distributions summarized in Table 5 show that unaligned states were the dominant type of target of intervention during this time period. Alliance bonds increased states' security, inasmuch as countries tied in alliances were less prone to be attacked than was expected, given their numbers in the international system. Presumably, the potential for an escalating conflict if a target's allies came to its defense served to deter adversaries' temptation to use force to influence their policies. Being unaligned increased a state's vulnerability, at least in the bipolar system that characterized the late 1970s and the 1980s.

The data also suggest that being a democracy dampened the dangers of nonalignment. Only the observed values for nondemocratic targets are greater than expected by chance; those for democracies are less. The  $m_b$  statistic of .92 suggests, consistent with our hypothesis, that democracies were less likely to be targets of military intervention regardless of the polity type of the initiator.<sup>6</sup> Being unaligned appears to

6. Throughout the rest of the analyses presented here we will use the  $m_b$  statistic to examine the relationship between our hypothesis and the data, taking into account the contending explanation. This statistic contrasts the size of the differences between the observed and expected frequencies in those cells that are consistent with the hypothesis and those that are inconsistent. We are interested in whether the observed frequencies are smaller than what is expected for the dyads with democracies as targets and larger for the dyads with nondemocracies as targets.



TABLE 5  
Alliance Status by Polity Type of Intervention Dyads, 1975-1991

Alliance Status of Target	Polity Type of Dyad				Total
	Democracy- Democracy	Democracy- Nondemocracy	Nondemocracy- Democracy	Nondemocracy- Nondemocracy	
Unaligned	O = 6 E = 5.4	O = 26 E = 10.5	O = 5 E = 10.5	O = 58 E = 20.4	95
Same alliance	O = 1 E = 6.3	O = 8 E = 12.3	O = 3 E = 12.3	O = 20 E = 23.8	32
Different alliance	O = 0 E = 6.3	O = 7 E = 12.3	O = 2 E = 12.3	O = 20 E = 23.8	29
Total	7	41	10	98	156
$\chi^2 = 126.53, p > .001$ Cramer's V = .64, $m_b = .92$					

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data. The *N* here is less than 193 because it does not include those dyads in which the initiator was unaligned.

have marked a nondemocracy as "fair game" for interventions by both democracies and nondemocracies, whereas they were more hesitant when the unaligned country was a democracy.

#### POLITICAL INSTABILITY

As we noted earlier, a number of scholars have argued that internal instability can increase a state's vulnerability to attack regardless of its polity type. Initiators of interventions can have more impact on what happens within countries experiencing political turmoil. Moreover, they may perceive a need to deal with such instability for fear it will spread beyond the unstable society's borders.

We assessed variations in countries' political stability in terms of regime persistence, following Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993). We determined the number of years a country had the same regime type score during the time period under examination. States were considered *unstable* if their scores changed in 4 or less years, *moderately stable* if the regime type persisted between 5 and 9 years, and *highly stable* if the score was continuous for 10 years or longer. These cutoff points were determined empirically after ascertaining the average persistence scores for all states in the Polity data set between 1975 and 1991. Table 6 presents the results, taking into account the stability of the target and the polity types of the dyads.

The data support what many advocates of democratic peace theory have postulated. The regimes that were less stable were the major targets of intervention during this time period; those that were highly stable tended not to be chosen as targets. But, like the findings for alignment mentioned earlier, the differences between expected and observed frequencies are larger for politically unstable nondemocracies than for

TABLE 6  
 Political Stability by Polity Type of Intervention Dyads, 1975-1991

Stability of Target	Polity Type of Dyad				Total
	Democracy-Democracy	Democracy-Nondemocracy	Nondemocracy-Democracy	Nondemocracy-Nondemocracy	
Low	O = 4 E = 2.1	O = 14 E = 4.2	O = 6 E = 4.2	O = 50 E = 8.6	74
Moderate	O = 2 E = 4.4	O = 9 E = 8.9	O = 1 E = 8.9	O = 22 E = 18	34
High	O = 6 E = 14.4	O = 24 E = 29.1	O = 8 E = 29.1	O = 45 E = 59.2	83
Total	12	47	15	117	191
$\chi^2 = 258.37, p > .001$ Cramer's V = .82, $m_b = .95$					

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data.

similarly unstable democracies. In fact, 86% of the chi-square value is accounted for by the differences found in the two cells in which nondemocracies were both the target and low in stability. Being a democracy appears to have reduced, although not eliminated, the chances of being selected as a target when a country was politically unstable.

LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A further reason states may be targeted for intervention is that they are poor and developing and more easily overpowered by such action (Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz and Russett 1992; Merritt and Zinnes 1991). Moreover, these states may have raw materials that both would benefit more developed countries' economies and can be acquired at a lower cost than by confronting a more capability-rich nation. Thus polity type may be less important than capabilities in determining who becomes a target of intervention.

In assessing level of economic development, we have followed the categorization constructed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is based on gross national product (GNP) per capita, literacy rates, mortality rates, and level of industrialization (see also U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1985, 1995). States were classified as developing, centrally planned economies, and developed. Table 7 displays these data by the polity types of the intervention dyads across the years 1975 to 1991.

The evidence shows that when developing countries were nondemocracies, they were chosen as targets more than would be expected by chance based on their numbers in the international system. Developing democracies were not targeted at greater-than-chance levels. Developed countries, regardless of polity type, were not intervened into

TABLE 7

## Level of Economic Development by Polity Type of Intervention Dyads, 1975-1991

Level of Economic Development of Target	Polity Type of Dyad				Total
	Democracy- Democracy	Democracy- Nondemocracy	Nondemocracy- Democracy	Nondemocracy- Nondemocracy	
Developing	O = 12 E = 14.7	O = 40 E = 28.6	O = 15 E = 28.6	O = 95 E = 55.5	162
Centrally planned	O = 0 E = 1.8	O = 2 E = 3.5	O = 0 E = 3.5	O = 10 E = 6.7	12
Developed	O = 0 E = 5.8	O = 6 E = 11.3	O = 1 E = 11.3	O = 12 E = 21.9	19
Total	12	48	16	117	193
$\chi^2 = 69.15, p > .001$					
Cramer's V = .42, $m_b = .78$					

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data.

as much as was expected. Once again, being a democracy seems to have dampened the effect of being a developing country in the perception of potential intervenors, whereas being a developing nondemocracy appears to have invited intervention.

#### DEGREE OF MILITARIZATION

A last potential contending explanation for our results is states' degree of militarization. By this variable we mean the extent to which a country's resources are concentrated on military preparedness in comparison to other national priorities. States that are highly militarized can become threatening to those with whom they come into contact and can trigger preventive military incursions. Such countries may arm to meet the increased military expenditures of adversaries in their region and may have reasons to fear these militarized neighbors. But, nonetheless, these highly militarized regimes arouse alarm and distrust in others and invite interventions to reduce the threat that their militarization poses.

In estimating states' degree of militarization, we have relied on data on the relative burden of military expenditures that were collected for each country for the years 1975 through 1991 by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1985, 1995). In these diachronic accounts, countries are arrayed according to their military expenditures per GNP (ME/GNP) and their GNP per capita. Regimes were considered *highly militarized* if their ME/GNP was greater than 2% and their GNP per capita was \$999 or less, *moderately militarized* if (a) their ME/GNP was either 2% or less and their GNP per capita was \$999 or less or (b) their ME/GNP was 2% or more and their GNP per capita was \$1,000 or more, and *low in militarization* if their ME/GNP was less than 2% and their GNP per capita was more than \$1,000. Using these indicators for

TABLE 8  
Degree of Militarization by Polity Type of Intervention Dyads, 1975-1991

Militarization of Target	Polity Type of Dyad				Total
	Democracy- Democracy	Democracy- Nondemocracy	Nondemocracy- Democracy	Nondemocracy- Nondemocracy	
Low	O = 2 E = 3.2	O = 0 E = 6.1	O = 3 E = 6.1	O = 2 E = 11.9	7
Moderate	O = 6 E = 8.7	O = 13 E = 16.8	O = 3 E = 16.8	O = 25 E = 32.6	47
High	O = 4 E = 4.8	O = 24 E = 9.4	O = 8 E = 9.4	O = 54 E = 18.2	90
Total	12	37	14	81	144
$\chi^2 = 124.92, p > .001$ Cramer's V = .66, $m_b = .73$					

NOTE: O refers to the observed number of acts of military intervention that occurred during this time period; E refers to the number of interventions that would be expected by chance, given the number of dyads of that particular type in the international system across this time period, based on the Polity data. The *N* here is less than 193 because data were not available on some of the dyads.

degree of militarization, the distributions of the intervention dyads by polity type are summarized in Table 8.

The results demonstrate that nondemocracies that were highly militarized were more prone to be targets of intervention, but such was not the case for democracies that had invested their national treasuries in developing their militaries. Both democracies and nondemocracies targeted nondemocracies that were highly militarized; some 75 percent of the chi-square is accounted for by the differences between the observed and expected frequencies in these two cells. The results suggest that, in general, nondemocracies may heighten the perception of their willingness to use force by engaging in militarization; in contrast, democracies may still be given the benefit of the doubt when they militarize. An initiator may perceive militarization to be self-protection in the latter case and security challenging in the former.

### SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

Table 9 presents the results of a probit analysis that examines the effect of polity type on being chosen as a target of intervention, controlling for the kinds of indicators that we have discovered appear to make states more vulnerable to intervention. As the previous analyses have suggested, between 1975 and 1991, a country—particularly a nondemocracy—was more vulnerable to intervention if it was unaligned, unstable, developing, or highly militarized. These characteristics seem to draw other regimes into such states' problems by enhancing the view that they may be a threat to the system or are "ripe for the picking." Does adding these variables attenuate the effect of being a democracy or alter its interpretation?

TABLE 9  
The Effects of Polity Type and Several Potentially Confounding Factors  
on Being Chosen as a Target of Intervention, 1975-1991

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Alternative Tests</i>				
	<i>Test 1</i>	<i>Test 2</i>	<i>Test 3</i>	<i>Test 4</i>	<i>Test 5</i>
Democracy as target	-.567** (.049)	-.732** (.115)	-.618** (.102)	-.600** (.098)	-.408** (.103)
Alliance bonds		-.410** (.055)			
Political stability			-.546** (.052)		
Level of economic development				-.319** (.054)	
Degree of militarization					.586** (.070)
Constant	-1.27** (.022)	-.529** (.109)	.125 (.131)	-.734** (.088)	-2.735** (.178)
Chi-square ( <i>df</i> )	51.08(1)**	16.50(2)**	33.74(2)**	8.28(2)*	34.59(2)**
Number of observations	2,176	1,763 <sup>a</sup>	2,176	2,176	1,632 <sup>a</sup>

NOTE: Main entries are probit regression coefficients; entries in parenthesis are standard errors.

a. The numbers are lower here because of missing data for some country-years.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ , two-tailed test.

In Table 9, the dependent variable is dichotomous, with 1 indicating that the state was the target of an intervention and 0 denoting it was not. The country-year serves as the unit of analysis. Summing the number of states in the international system according to the Polity data across the 17-year period between 1975 and 1991, there are a total of 2,176 country-years (or opportunities to be selected as a target of intervention). All but the polity type independent variable were assessed in a similar manner to that described earlier and displayed in Tables 5 through 8. In determining the "democracy as target" independent variable, we collapsed the dyadic polity types in the previous analyses into a dichotomous variable that indicated whether the target of the intervention was a democracy (1) or not (0).

An examination of the results shows that democracies were less likely to experience interventions during this time period; the effect was significant across the four potentially confounding factors. The probit coefficient for polity type is augmented when alliance bonds, political stability, or level of economic development are added into the regression equation and diminished when degree of militarization is included. As we learned from the analyses reported in Tables 5 through 8, these indicators enhance the vulnerability of nondemocracies. The data suggest that although such may be the case for being an unaligned, politically unstable, developing country, being highly militarized may decrease the potency of democracy as a shield from attack. Although each indicator of vulnerability was itself significantly associated with

intervention in the various tests reflected in Table 9, the chi-square goodness-of-fit value is the strongest for polity type by itself.

### DEMOCRACY: A SECURITY SHIELD

The data probed here support the observation by Morgan and Campbell (1991, 209) that “the relationship between domestic structure and war is context dependent and much more complex than commonly believed.” Our evidence suggests that, in the most recent time period for which data are available and as the number of democracies in the international system was increasing, democracy served as a shield from military intervention by another state.

Why is this approach to national security, long berated, now becoming vindicated? One plausible explanation is that a previously unappreciated benefit of being considered democratic in the current international system is the expectation conveyed to other states that one values negotiation, mediation, compromise, and consensus over the use of force. A set of diplomatic options is available in a dispute with a democracy that is not as attractive or useful when dealing with a nondemocracy. “Liberal democracies are more likely to be less bellicose than totalitarian regimes” (Haass 1994, 125) in part because they project an image that they are instinctively receptive to non-zero-sum thinking in their approach to bargaining. The evidence reported here suggests that this perception may deter the use of bullets and bombs against democracies as methods of coercive diplomacy. In this sense, democratization may increase a state’s security.

The power of this barrier is implied by the fact that democracies are less likely to be invaded not only by other democracies but also by nondemocracies (both anocracies and autocracies). In contrast, countries whose leaders are *not* subject to electoral accountability or collective decision making are much more vulnerable to foreign intervention; the external security of these nondemocratic countries declines in association with their lack of respect for democratic governance practices. Countries that choose their leaders through the ballot and hold them accountable signal to the external world a willingness to negotiate disputes and accept mediation. It may well be that this reputation shapes expectations and attributions that, in turn, curtail the need for others to confront them with the same military means that often seem necessary in resolving conflicts with nondemocratic regimes.

The findings in the present research inspire confidence in the payoffs of democratization. But the payoffs are not along the lines generally argued by democratic peace theory. That theory has viewed the sources of the democratic peace almost exclusively from the perspective of the actors contemplating the use of force, concentrating on the institutional and normative constraints within liberal democracies that inhibit leaders from using force against other democracies (for an overview of this literature, see Hermann and Kegley 1995; Kegley and Hermann 1997b). The focus in the search for causation conventionally has been on the political system of the initiator in a democratic dyad. Usually overlooked are the perceived characteristics of the target and the consequences that result from such perceptions.



This oversight has masked from view the security interests that may accrue to a democracy by virtue of the expectations such ascriptions offer. It is a demonstrable fact that countries are unlikely to intervene against a democracy, but this finding remains unappreciated if the political system of the target and images of its likely behavior are not factored into the explanatory equation. The barriers to intervention in democracies may be substantial because such governments' respect for their citizens' freedoms make coercive diplomacy against them difficult to justify. This inference is suggested by Mintz and Geva (1993), who observed in their simulation of a foreign policy crisis that subjects were likely to view the need to use force against a democracy as a foreign policy failure.

The discovery that the polity type of the target matters does exert pressure to elaborate democratic peace theory by proposing that a country's security can be increased if it becomes democratic, particularly when democracy holds a valued position in the international system. The evidence warrants taking seriously the liberal view that a country's capacity to deter attack can be increased by liberal reforms in its governing institutions and acceptance of civil liberties. Ballots, not just bullets and bombs, contribute to a nation's defense.

Research has shown that democracies rarely engage in war with one another. We observe, in addition, that democracies are less likely to be the targets of military intervention. Together, these findings indicate that something about being a democracy differentiates it from other polity types when it comes to considerations of war and peace. Although the data in the present study tell us the circumstances under which a nondemocracy is likely to be chosen as a target of intervention, they do not tell us which aspects of democratic governance most increase a democracy's invulnerability. What discourages potential aggressors from intervening into democratic countries when conflicts arise within them? What properties of a democratic target most inhibit others from using military force against it? Future research needs to address these questions.

To give direction to further investigations, let us speculate about some possible reasons why democracies are not chosen as targets of military intervention. First, the evidence suggests that the psychocultural milieu surrounding interstate interaction may be far more important in shaping the way disputes are resolved than most theories have argued. Adversaries' images of a country and its likely strategies for dealing with conflict, as influenced by leaders' perceptions of that state's values and institutions, may be critical determinants of whether force is used. If images do, indeed, count, future research may want to adopt "a decision-making perspective toward the explanation of why [acts of military intervention] occur" (Morgan and Schwebach 1992, 307) and why democracies are seldom victims of this kind of illegal interference in their internal affairs. Does an adversary's view of the extent to which leaders of a democracy embrace liberal norms, are accountable to the public, and are constrained by democratic institutions influence the instruments of statecraft that they choose in a potential intervention situation? Do such leaders "have less incentive to initiate an attack" (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993, 219) if their adversary is seen as restrained by its population? Several studies lend support to these ideas. For example, when given

the choice in a simulated conflict situation to use force against a country with a nondemocratic or democratic political system, subjects (students and nonstudent adults) were more likely to approve force against the nondemocratic than democratic potential adversary (Mintz and Geva 1993). Similarly, Owen (1994) and Ray (1995) discuss cases that show how the perceptions of an adversary's political system have influenced leaders' decisions on whether to use force.

But it is not just the leaders' images that may be important. Expectations that the public in a democracy assumes that diplomatic channels will be exhausted before military force is considered also may affect adversaries' decisions. In democracies, the instrument of force usually is seen as the instrument of last resort unless survival is under threat. Because members of democratic civil societies are reputed to place a high value on diplomacy, bargaining, and mediation, other states can expect them to prefer these tools of statecraft over use of force. These attributions are likely to shape how other countries will react in a conflict with a democracy. Punitive action and military intermediation are unlikely to be regarded as warranted against a liberal government that predictably will respond with an offer to negotiate.

Moreover, as Maoz and Russett (1993) observe, the time it takes a democracy to ascertain where important constituents stand and to build a consensus on what to do in response to a crisis affords opportunities for international bargaining. Thus those in conflict with a democracy have incentives to bargain rather than fight. Often democracies must engage in a series of steps incrementally leading to a decision to use force. Leaders in such systems are more likely to perceive themselves constrained by a legislature (or parliament), salient interest groups, public opinion, and specific bureaucracies in making the judgment regarding using force; they must build broad support before turning to a military solution. We can assume that adversaries are well aware of these restraints and can readily envision the obstacles that face democratic leaders as they move through this consensus-building process. Furthermore, adversaries are more likely to view democracies' need for a public mandate as resulting in a compromise that is less, rather than more, risky and in decisions that are more middle-of-the-road than extreme (Hermann and Hermann 1989). Such outcomes reduce an adversary's interest in sending troops to accelerate resolution of the conflict.

There is yet another possible explanation for the reluctance of enemies to attack democratic states. When a leader contemplates attacking a democratic country, he or she is very likely to take into account the high probability that such a bellicose action will affect every aspect of the target's society, mobilizing all parts of the pluralistic society in support of staunch resistance and retaliation. When a democracy is attacked, it is not just the head of government with which the attacker must fight—it is that leader's entire population. The mass public in a democracy becomes the actor with which the aggressor must deal. If attacked, aroused public opinion can push for even more extreme reactions than leaders might otherwise condone (Hughes 1976; Ostrom and Job 1986; Ray 1995). Nothing is more difficult to combat than a mobilized population that perceives its way of life threatened. An enemy dare not disregard this possibility. Through their collective sense of commitment to the preservation of liberty, a democracy's people make a powerful contribution to its defense.

Regardless of the reasons for the relative security of democratic countries, the core proposition of democratic peace theory receives support from the evidence presented here. Ballots tend to reduce the vulnerability of democratic countries from foreign attack. Elective governance, of course, does not eliminate foreign attack completely. There are instances when democracies are the targets of intervention. But these instances generally fall below what their numbers in the international system would predict. If peace is to be preserved beyond the post-cold-war world and into the twenty-first century, then the continued promotion of democratization can contribute to international security by increasing the preeminence of democracy as the preferred form of governance and by providing extra defense to those countries that choose to be ruled by the consent of the governed. This study suggests that there are incentives for countries to democratize and for existing democratic governments to call for the enlargement of the democratic community.

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